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Seasonal fluctuations are as large as cyclical fluctuations. Monetary policy in the United
States has dealt with seasonality by smoothing nominal rates of interest. The original
motivation for this was that seasonality in nominal interest rates put recurring strain on the
banking system. We build a model of monetary policy in the presence of seasonality that
puts financial market conditions in the foreground. Our findings are as follows. Insulating
nominal rates of interest or rates of inflation from seasonal variation are the basis for a
formula for generating indeterminacy of equilibria and excess volatility. Preventing
seasonality in the rate of monetary growth does not suffer from this problem. Moreover,
under any method for conducting monetary policy, the setting of the target value of the
monetary instrument will affect the degree of seasonal variability in most endogenous
variables. This is a new channel by which monetary policy can have real effects. The case
for eliminating seasonality in nominal rates of interest is strongest when seasonal
impulses derive from shifts in money demand. It is weakest when seasonal impulses
derive from the real sector.
Keywords: Seasonal Fluctuations, Monetary Policy, Nominal Interest Rates, Inflation
Rates
In a system in which the monetary authorities effectively control the money stock,
they must decide explicitly how much seasonal change to introduce. . . . Should they
determine the seasonal change so as to eliminate any seasonal movement in interest
rates?. . . Or should they determine the seasonal change to introduce into money by
an observed seasonal movement in velocity?
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 295)
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1. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the advent of the Federal Reserve System, the U.S. economy was beset
by recurring financial crises. As noted by Miron (1986) and Champ et al. (1996),
bank panics were closely associated with seasonal financial stringencies. Indeed,
bank panics tended to occur roughly at the same time as crops were harvested
and moved to market. Crop moving was itself associated with a simultaneous high
level of currency demand to make payments,1 and a high level of credit demand
because workers had to be paid at harvest and crops had to be purchased and
shipped before they could be sold and revenue could be realized. As a result, there
were recurring seasonal “strains” on the banking system. In the views of Andrew
(1908), Sprague (1910), and Goodhart (1969), when these strains occurred, it took
only small additional pressure on the banking system to create a crisis.
Accompanying these seasonal strains were large seasonal movements in nominal
rates of interest. Contemporaries, such as Laurence Laughlin (1912), took the view
that banking panics were but one—and perhaps a relatively minor—manifestation
of the costs of large seasonal variation in nominal interest rates.
The Federal Reserve System was empowered to create an “elastic currency” that
would eliminate recurrent seasonal tightness in financial markets. And, “the sys-
tem was almost entirely successful in the stated objective of eliminating seasonal
strain” Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 293). Nonetheless, the question posed by
Friedman and Schwartz remains as pertinent today as it was when they wrote it, or
as it was in 1914. Does it represent “good” monetary policy for any central bank
to eliminate seasonal variability in nominal rates of interest? A central bank could,
for example, be equally concerned about seasonal movements in the price level or
the rate of inflation. Or, it could follow conventional monetarist prescriptions that
it should maintain a stable rate of growth in some monetary aggregate, so that the
rate of growth in the appropriate defined money stock would not vary seasonally.
Would any of these alternatives constitute a better means of conducting monetary
policy?
The appropriate seasonal conduct of monetary policy continues to be of great
importance. Barsky and Miron (1989, p. 509) found that “deterministic seasonal
fluctuations account for more than 85% of the fluctuations in the rate of growth
of real output and more than 55% of the (percentage) deviations from trend.” In
addition, although there is no seasonality in nominal rates of interest, “seasonal
dummies account for approximately 50% of the variation in the log growth rate
of money” (1989, p. 513). Interestingly, the policy of insulating nominal interest
rates from seasonal variability also seems largely to insulate the rate of infla-
tion from seasonal variability. Barsky and Miron (p. 509) found that “seasonal
dummies explain only 3.0% of total variation” in the growth rate of the price
level.
There is also reason to believe that the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations and
the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations are related. Beaulieu et al. (1992) found a
strong positive correlation across countries and industries between the standard
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deviation of the seasonal component and the standard deviation of the cyclical com-
ponent of aggregate variables. In the same spirit, Wen (2001) found that seasonal
shocks explain 50% of the cyclical fluctuations in aggregate output. Thus, the eco-
nomic propagation mechanism transmitting seasonal fluctuations from exogenous
to endogenous variables may be systematically related to that transmitting business
cycles.
To summarize, seasonal fluctuations have been, and continue to be, of major
economic importance. They are, arguably, more important than business-cycle
fluctuations. Yet, although the literature on the appropriate response of monetary
policy to business-cycle fluctuations is enormous, there is, relatively speaking,
little modern literature on the appropriate treatment of seasonality by a monetary
authority.2
We propose to conduct an analysis of the appropriate seasonal stance of monetary
policy. In contrast to much of the existing literature on seasonality—and in keeping
with the views of Andrew (1908), Sprague (1910), Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
and Goodhart (1969)—we will proceed on the basis of the notion that seasonal
fluctuations exert much of their effect by affecting conditions in money and credit
markets. Thus, we base our analysis on a model that brings banking and “credit
market” conditions to the forefront.
More specifically, we consider a model in which spatial separation and limited
communication create a transactions role for currency, and in which randomness
associated with agents’ patterns of movement creates a role for banks to insure
agents against idiosyncratic liquidity needs. We also introduce deterministic sea-
sonal fluctuations. On the basis of the notion that the appropriate seasonal conduct
of monetary policy could, at least in principle, depend on the source of seasonal
impulses, we consider three possible sources of seasonality. One is seasonal vari-
ability in income (here, endowments). A second is seasonal variability in real rates
of return. Such variability could arise, for example, as a result of seasonal fluctua-
tions in credit demand [Sargent and Wallace (1982)]. Here it arises from seasonal
fluctuations in a technological parameter that affects real rates of interest. And the
third source of seasonality arises from fluctuations in a parameter that governs the
demand for money.
In this setting, we consider four alternative methods of conducting monetary
policy. Three of these are quite simple: we analyze policies that prevent seasonal
fluctuations from being manifested in either (a) the rate of money creation, (b)
the nominal interest rate, or (c) the rate of inflation. We then go on to consider a
further policy in which the central bank targets an optimal seasonal time path for
the nominal rate of interest. In the context of this last policy, we can analyze the
optimal degree of seasonal variability in nominal rates of interest.
We analyze these policies along several dimensions. One is their implications
for welfare. However, we also consider the implications of different methods of
conducting monetary policy for the determinacy of equilibria, and for the poten-
tial for endogenously generated volatility to arise. Here, our thinking is guided by
Friedman (1960, p. 23), who argued that “the central problem [of monetary policy]
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is not to construct a highly sensitive instrument that can continuously offset in-
stability introduced by other factors, but rather to prevent monetary arrangements
from themselves becoming a primary source of instability.”
The results we obtain are as follows. First, preventing seasonal fluctuations from
being manifested in nominal interest rates and/or the rate of inflation is a policy that
can easily—and under empirically plausible assumptions about parameter values
will—lead to an indeterminacy of perfect-foresight equilibria. Thus, a policy of
insulating nominal rates of interest or the rate of inflation from seasonal fluctu-
ations can easily create additional, market-generated, sources of variability over
and above the exogenous sources of seasonal variation in an economy. The same
problem does not arise under a policy that maintains a constant rate of money
growth.
Second, in a steady-state or purely periodic equilibrium, we show that whether or
not it is a “good idea” to eliminate seasonality in the nominal rate of interest depends
heavily on the source of seasonal impulses. If seasonal fluctuations derive primarily
from changes in the demand schedule for money, then smoothing nominal rates
of interest (and the rate of inflation) seasonally is a relatively “good” policy from
a welfare perspective. However, if seasonality arises from exogenous fluctuations
in income (endowments), eliminating seasonality in the nominal rate of interest
is a relatively “bad” policy. An optimal policy allows nominal rates of interest to
display larger seasonal movements than the movements in income. Somewhere in
between lie seasonal fluctuations that affect real rates of return. Here, the optimal
policy allows the nominal rate of interest to vary seasonally. However, seasonal
variations in it should be fairly small relative to seasonal movements in the rate of
interest. Interestingly, the flavor of these results has much in common with Poole’s
(1970) results regarding when it is and is not desirable to prevent the nominal rate of
interest from responding to either random or deterministic exogenous fluctuations.
Furthermore, we show that in an economy with seasonal variation of a magnitude
similar to that observed in the United States, the Friedman rule (a zero nominal
rate of interest) need not be optimal. In particular, it may allow for too little (i.e.,
no) seasonal variation in nominal rates of interest.
Finally, within any given monetary regime, the setting of the appropriate target
variable for monetary policy will affect the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations in
most endogenous variables. Thus, for example, if the central bank targets the rate of
growth of the money supply and insulates it from any seasonal variation, we are able
to show that higher rates of money growth will induce greater seasonal variability
in real balances, investment, and the rate of inflation. This finding, for which
we provide some empirical support, has an important policy implication. Since
seasonal fluctuations are large relative to business-cycle fluctuations, and since
monetary policy can affect the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations in endogenous
variables, an important channel by which monetary policy can affect the real
economy has largely been overlooked.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the eco-
nomic environment and the behavior of agents. Sections 3 and 4 discuss a general
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equilibrium under different methods of conducting monetary policy. Section 5 ex-
plores the welfare consequences of smoothing the nominal rate of interest. Finally,
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2. MODEL
2.1. Environment
We consider a discrete-time economy populated by an infinite sequence of two-
period-lived, overlapping generations. Let t = 1, 2 . . . index time. In each period,
economic activity takes place in two physically separate locations, denoted loca-
tions 1 and 2. These locations are symmetric, so that there is no need to index
variables separately by location.
At each date t , a new young generation appears in each location. This generation
consists of a continuum of agents with mass Nt = (1 + n)t in each location.
We consider a single-good, pure exchange economy (with storage). At date t ,
young agents have a (before-tax) endowment of wt > 0 units of the good. Old
agents have no endowment.
For simplicity, we assume that agents value consumption only in the second
period of life.3 As a result, young agents save their entire after-tax endowment.
And, if c denotes second-period consumption, young agents have the lifetime
utility u(c) = c1−ρ/(1 − ρ). Throughout, we assume that ρ ∈ (0, 1).4
There are two (primary) assets in this economy: money and storage. All agents
have access to a technology for storing the good whereby one unit stored at t yields
xt units of consumption at time t + 1. We assume that xt > 1 + n holds, so that use
of the storage technology is socially efficient.
2.2. Spatial Separation and Limited Communication
Following Townsend (1987), we use spatial separation and limited communication
to motivate a transactions role for currency. And, following Champ et al. (1996) or
Schreft and Smith (1997), we use stochastic relocation among disparate locations
to generate a role for banks.
At the beginning of each period, each young agent is assigned to one of the
locations. At this point in time, agents cannot move between or communicate across
locations. Thus, goods and asset-market transactions occur within each location
at the beginning of each period. After trade and savings decisions have occurred
at time t , some randomly selected fraction πt of young agents from location 1
is chosen to move to location 2 and vice versa, so that the two locations remain
symmetric. We assume that stored goods are not transportable, either because
transporting them is too costly or investment returns have not been realized at
the time when agents are relocated. Moreover, as in Townsend (1987) or Champ
et al. (1996), limited communication implies that relocated agents cannot transact
with privately issued liabilities in their new location. As a result, relocated agents
need currency to transact. However, within-location communication does permit
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“credit” transactions. Thus, agents who are not relocated do not need currency to
make purchases. Relocation constitutes a physical story about which goods are
“cash goods” (those purchased by relocated agents) and which are “credit goods”
(those purchased by nonrelocated agents).
The need to transact in cash, if one is relocated, implies that agents who move
between locations must liquidate all other assets prior to moving, and convert them
into currency. If currency is dominated in the rate of return—the situation on which
we focus throughout the paper—then the necessity of converting higher-yielding
assets into lower-yielding currency constitutes an adverse shock that agents will
wish to be insured against. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), such insurance can
be provided by banks. Their activities are described below.
2.3. The Government
The government in this economy has a variety of policies from which to choose. It
could follow a policy of maintaining a constant rate of money creation, or it may
choose to target either the nominal rate of interest or the rate of inflation. However,
independent of the “operating procedure for monetary policy,” we assume that all
required injections or withdrawals of money are accomplished through lump-sum
tax/transfers to young agents.
Let Mt be the value of the time t nominal money stock, let pt be the time t price
level, and let τt be the real value of lump-sum transfers made to young agents at t .
Then, the government’s budget constraint is
Nt+1τt+1 = Mt+1 − Mtpt+1 . (1)
2.4. Banks
As we have noted, the fact that agents are subject to stochastic relocation implies
that there is a role for banks to provide liquidity. We now describe the behavior of
these banks.
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), all savings will be intermediated. Hence, at
the beginning of period t , each young agent deposits his/her after-tax endowment
(savings), wt + τt , with a bank. The bank uses these deposits to acquire money and
storage investments. Money is held by the bank as cash reserves to pay relocated
agents.
We assume that the time t relocation probability, πt , is known by all agents at the
beginning of period t . Thus, the fraction of agents who will withdraw early—and
who require payment in currency—is known with certainty by each bank.
Let zt and kt denote the per-depositor quantity of real balances and storage
investment, respectively, acquired by a bank at t . The gross real rate of return on
real balances between t and t + 1 is pt/pt+1; the gross real rate of return on storage
is xt . The bank is competitive in asset markets. Therefore, it takes these values as
given. At the same time, banks offer two gross real rates of return to depositors: rmt
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per unit deposited to agents who are relocated, and rt per unit deposited to agents
who are not relocated. The bank faces the following constraints on its choices of
zt , kt , rmt , and rt . First, bank assets must not exceed bank liabilities, so that
zt + kt ≤ wt + τt . (2)
Second, payments to relocated agents at t , πt (wt + τt )rmt , cannot exceed the time
t + 1 value of the bank’s cash reserves because relocated agents require currency
to make transactions. Hence,
πt (wt + τt )rmt ≤ zt
pt
pt+1
. (3)
The presence of the term pt/pt+1 in this expression reflects any depreciation of
currency values that occurs between the time when currency is acquired (t) and
when it is spent (t + 1).
Finally, payments to nonrelocated agents, (1 − πt )(wt + τt )rt , cannot exceed
the income from the bank’s capital investments and bond holdings. Thus,
(1 − πt )(wt + τt )rt ≤ kt xt . (4)
Implicit in these constraints is the notion that banks do not carry real balances
between periods. Given the predictability of withdrawal demand, this will be the
case if currency is dominated in the rate of return, so that xt > pt/pt+1 holds—as
we henceforth assume.
As a coalition of ex ante identical depositors, the bank maximizes depositor
expected utility,
πt
(
(wt + τt )rmt
)1−ρ
1 − ρ + (1 − πt )
((wt + τt )rt )1−ρ
1 − ρ
by choice of zt , kt , rmt , and rt . The solution to this problem can be described as
follows. First, the optimal ratio of reserves to deposits is given by
zt
wt + τt ≡ γ (It , πt ) =
1
1 + 1 − πt
πt
I
1−ρ
ρ
t
,
where It = xt (pt+1/pt ) denotes gross nominal rate of interest.5 The ratio of storage
to deposits is then given by kt/(wt +τt ) = 1−γ (It , πt ). In addition, the gross rates
of return obtained by depositors can then be derived from (3) and (4) at equality. It
is easy to verify that rt = I 1/ρt rmt . Thus, when nominal rates of interest are positive,
agents receive less than complete insurance against the event of being relocated.
This is true because, in order to provide such insurance, the bank must hold cash
reserves. However, the bank perceives an opportunity cost of doing so, which is
related to the nominal rate of interest. Note that the higher the nominal rate of
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interest (the greater the opportunity cost of holding reserves), the greater is the
“wedge” between the consumption of agents who are and are not relocated.
The solution to the bank’s maximization problem is fully summarized by the
optimal reserve deposit ratio γ (It , πt ). For future reference, we summarize some
properties of this function.
LEMMA 1.
(a) γ (1, πt ) = πt .
(b) It γ1(It ,πt )
γ (It ,πt )
= − 1−ρ
ρ
(1 − γ (It , πt )) < 0.
With ρ < 1, increases in the nominal interest rate induce banks to economize on
reserve holdings.
2.5. Sources of Seasonality
Our intention is to consider how seasonal fluctuations affect this economy, and to
consider how monetary policy should best respond to exogenous seasonal vari-
ability. Of particular interest is whether it is a good idea to insulate the nominal
interest rate, It , from seasonal fluctuations. As we have just seen, if It fluctuates
seasonally, the wedge between rates of return received by relocated and nonrelo-
cated agents will also fluctuate seasonally, affecting the provision of insurance by
banks. We investigate whether it is desirable for the government to prevent such
seasonal fluctuations.
The answer to this question might, in principal, depend on the source of sea-
sonality. Here, we consider three different potential sources of exogenously driven
seasonality. One might derive from changes in production conditions that induce
seasonal variability in real rates of return. We can capture seasonal variations that
affect real rates of return by allowing the rate of return on storage to vary in the
following deterministic manner6 xt = xe(xo) for t even (odd).
Second, there may be seasonal variations in the general availability of re-
sources. We can capture this type of seasonality by allowing endowments to satisfy
wt = we(wo) for t even (odd).
Finally, seasonal fluctuations may derive from deterministic variation in the
need for currency in transactions. For instance, historically, cash use rose during
harvest seasons as crops were moved to market. Alternatively, the need for cash
may rise in seasons when the volume of other transactions is fairly large, say
at Christmas. In any event, we can induce seasonality in cash use by letting the
relocation probability, πt , vary deterministically: πt = πe(πo) for t even (odd).
In the analysis, we consider each possible source of seasonality, although often
we assume that only one source of seasonality operates at a time.
3. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
The basic condition of equilibrium is that the supply of money and the demand for
money be equal. Since all savings are intermediated, all beginning-of-period asset
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demand derives from banks. It follows that the money market clears at each date
if
zt = γ (It , πt )(wt + τt ); t ≥ 1. (5)
We now consider how an equilibrium is determined under different simple policies
that the government might follow.
3.1. Constant Money Growth Rate Rule
One policy that the government might follow is to insulate the rate of money growth
from seasonal fluctuations. Here we represent such a policy simply by letting the
nominal stock of money grow at the constant gross rate σ , which the government
selects exogenously—and once and for all—at date 1. Thus, Mt+1 = σ Mt ; t ≥ 0
and where M0 > 0 is given as an initial condition. Equation (5), the government
budget constraint (1), and the definition of zt imply that
τt = σ − 1
σ
zt , ∀t ≥ 1.
Then, it follows from the money-market-clearing condition (5) that
zt =

 γ (It , πt )
1 − σ − 1
σ
γ (It , πt )

wt . (6)
Moreover,
It = xt pt+1pt ≡ σ
xt
1 + n
zt
zt+1
holds. Using these relations, Gomis-Poqueras and Smith (2002) derive the follow-
ing result.
LEMMA 2. Under a constant money growth rate rule, the equilibrium law of
motion for zt satisfies
zt+1 = ztσ xt1 + n


1 − πt
πt
zt
wt − zt
σ


ρ
1−ρ
. (7)
3.2. Nominal-Interest-Rate Targeting
An alternative method of conducting monetary policy, and one that is closer to
current and historical practice in the Federal Reserve System, is to prevent the
nominal rate of interest from fluctuating seasonally. A simple policy that would
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accomplish this is for the central bank to target a constant value I for the rate of
interest, so that It = I ∀ t ≥ 1.7 Under this policy,
pt−1
pt
= xt−1
It−1
, t ≥ 2. (8)
It then follows from the government budget constraint that
τt = zt − zt−1 pt−1pt
1
1 + n = zt − zt−1
(
xt−1
1 + n
)
1
It−1
. (9)
Using (9) in the money-market-clearing condition (5), and using the fact that
It = I , we obtain the following equilibrium law of motion for zt :
zt = γ (I, πt )1 − γ (I, πt )
(
wt − zt−1xt−1I (1 + n)
)
= πt
1 − πt (I )
ρ−1
ρ
(
wt − zt−1xt−1I (1 + n)
)
, t≥ 2.
(10)
3.3. Inflation Targeting
A third “operating procedure” for monetary policy might be to prevent seasonal
fluctuations from being reflected in the time path of the inflation rate (or, possibly,
from being reflected in the time path of the nominal price level). One policy that
would accomplish this would be to have a central bank target a value for the initial
price level, p∗1 , and thereafter to maintain a target inflation rate, so that
pt+1
pt
= η ∀ t ≥ 1.
Under inflation (or price-level) targeting rules, the government budget constraint
becomes
τt = zt − zt−1 pt−1pt
1
1 + n = zt −
zt−1
η(1 + n) , t ≥ 2. (11)
Using (11) in the money-market-clearing condition (5), we obtain the following
equilibrium law of motion for zt :
zt = γ (It , πt )1 − γ (It , πt )
(
wt − zt−1
η(1 + n)
)
= πt
1 − πt I
ρ−1
ρ
t
(
wt − zt−1
η(1 + n)
)
, t ≥ 2,
(12)
where It = ηxt . Notice that, unless xt exhibits seasonal fluctuations, the policies
of targeting the nominal rate of interest and of targeting the time path of the price
level lead to identical equilibrium laws of motion for real balances. Given the low
level of observed seasonality in the real rate of interest, this is consistent with the
observation made in the introduction: The policy of eliminating seasonality in the
nominal rate of interest also largely eliminates seasonality in the rate of inflation.
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4. SEASONALITY AND MONETARY POLICY
We now examine the consequences of different methods of conducting monetary
policy. We begin by examining periodic equilibria under alternative operating
procedures for the central bank.
4.1. Constant Rates of Money Growth
As before, we begin by considering a policy that maintains a constant gross rate of
money creation, σ . In addition, as noted earlier, we seek periodic equilibria, that
is, equilibria with zt = ze(zo) for t even (odd), and It = Ie(Io) for t even (odd).
When zt evolves according to (7), we in fact have
It =
(
σ xt
1 + n
)
zt
zt+1
. (13)
Then, equation (6) implies that, in order for the money market to clear,
zt =
γ
(
σ xt
1 + n
zt
zt+1
, πt
)
wt
1 − σ − 1
σ
γ
(
σ xt
1 + n
zt
zt+1
, πt
) . (14)
Define the function Q(y, σ ) as follows:
Q(y, σ ) ≡


γ
(
σ xe
1 + n y, πe
)
we
γ
(
σ xo
1 + n
1
y
, πo
)
wo


1 − σ − 1
σ
γ
(
σ xo
1 + n
1
y
, πo
)
1 − σ − 1
σ
γ
(
σ xe
1 + n y, πe
)
≡
1 + 1 − πo
πo
σ 1/ρ
(
xo
1 + n
1
y
) 1−ρ
ρ
1 + 1 − πe
πe
σ 1/ρ
(
xe
1 + n y
) 1−ρ
ρ
.
Then, it follows from (13) and (14) that, in any nontrivial periodic equilibrium,
ze
zo
= Q
(
ze
zo
, σ
)
. (15)
Lemma 4 describes some properties of the function Q. Its proof appears in Gomis-
Poqueras and Smith (2002).
LEMMA 4. Q(y, σ ) satisfies
(a) limy→0 Q(y, σ ) = ∞,
(b) limy→∞ Q(y, σ ) = 0,
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FIGURE 1. Determination of periodic equilibria under a constant rate of money growth.
(c) Q1(y, σ ) < 0,
(d) Q2(y, σ ) ≥ (<)0 holds if
√
xo
xe
( πe1−πe
1−πo
πo
)
ρ
2(1−ρ) ≥ (<)y,
(e) Q(√ xo
xe
( πe1−πe
1−πo
πo
)
ρ
2(1−ρ) ) = 1.
A periodic equilibrium with Ie > 1 and Io > 1 is a solution to (15) that satisfies
the additional condition
σ xo
1 + n >
ze
zo
>
xe
(1 + n)σ . (16)
The determination of such an equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. The following
result is immediate from an inspection of the figure.
PROPOSITION 1. A periodic equilibrium with Ie > 1 and Io > 1 exists iff
Q
(
1 + n
σ xe
, σ
)
>
1 + n
σ xe
(17)
Q
(
σ xo
1 + n , σ
)
<
σ xo
1 + n . (18)
If (17) and (18) hold, then the desired periodic equilibrium exists, and we can
ask questions about the consequences of varying the rate of money growth, σ .
Part (d) of Lemma 4 implies that an increase in σ shifts Q(ze/zo, σ ) upward
(downward) in Figure 2 if
ze
zo
≤ (≥)
√
xo
xe
(
πe
1 − πe
1 − πo
πo
)ρ/(2(1−ρ))
.
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FIGURE 2. Effect of an increase in the money growth rate on periodic equilibria when
ze/zo > 1 and σ2 > σ1.
Thus,
∂(ze/zo)
∂σ
> (<)0 i f ze/zo > (<)1.
Figure 2 depicts the case ze/zo > 1. The opposite case is similar, and the following
result is then immediate.
PROPOSITION 2. (a) An increase in the rate of money creation increases the
magnitude of seasonal fluctuations in real balances. (b) If xe = xo (there are no
seasonal fluctuations in real rates of return), then an increase in the rate of money
creation increases the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations in the nominal rate
of interest. (c) If xe = xo, then an increase in the rate of money creation increases
the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations in the rate of inflation.
In particular, if ze/zo > (<)1, then real balances are highest in even (odd)
periods. Also, an increase in σ raises (lowers) ze relative to zo. Moreover,
Ie/Io = (xe/xo)(ze/zo)2. Thus, if xe = xo and if ze/zo > (<)1, nominal interest
rates are relatively high in even (odd) periods. Furthermore, an increase in σ raises
(lowers) ze relative to zo, and hence raises (lowers) Ie relative to Io. Finally, when
t is even, (pt+1/pt )(pt−1/pt ) = (xo/xe)(Ie/Io), and then the same observations
imply that increases in σ increase seasonal variation in the rate of inflation.
Proposition 2 has an important corollary. The setting of monetary policy (the
choice of σ ) affects the size of seasonal fluctuations in all endogenous variables.
Moreover, as we have noted, seasonal fluctuations are large relative to business-
cycle fluctuations. Thus, monetary policy has considerable scope to influence vari-
ability in economic activity. Also, failure to attribute some seasonal fluctuations
to the conduct of monetary policy underemphasizes the importance of monetary
policy for real fluctuations.
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4.2. Constant Nominal Interest Rates
We now examine how monetary policy affects the magnitude of seasonal fluctu-
ations when the central bank follows the policy of maintaining a constant value
for the nominal rate of interest.8 Also, as before, in this section we restrict our
attention to periodic equilibria, so that zt = ze(zo) for t even (odd).
Finally, to reduce the number of possible cases that require consideration, in
this section we assume that
1 >
πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo (I
2)−1/ρ
xexo
(1 + n)2 , (19)
where I is the target value for the nominal rate of interest.9
In a periodic equilibrium, equation (10) implies that the equilibrium values of
real balances satisfy
zt =
πt
1 − πt wt I
ρ−1
ρ − πt
1 − πt
πt−1
1 − πt−1 I
ρ−2
ρ
xt−1
1 + n wt−1
1 − πt
1 − πt
πt−1
1 − πt−1 I
−2
ρ
xt−1xt
(1 + n)2
. (20)
Equation (19) implies that the target nominal rate of interest must be set so that
the denominator of the right-hand side of equation (20) is positive.
Equation (20) implies that
ze
zo
=
πe
1 − πe we −
πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo I
−1
ρ
xo
1 + n wo
πo
1 − πo wo −
πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo I
−1
ρ
xe
1 + n we
. (21)
Using this relation, Gomis-Poqueras and Smith (2002) prove the following result.
PROPOSITION 3. The equilibrium corresponding to a constant nominal inter-
est rate satisfies
(a) ze ≥ (<)zo if
πe
1 − πe we −
πo
1 − πo wo ≥ (<), (22)
πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo
(
xo
1 + n wo −
xe
1 + n we
)
I −1/ρ;
(b) [∂(ze/zo)]/∂ I ≥ (<)0 holds if
πo
1 − πo xow
2
o ≥ (<)
πe
1 − πe xew
2
e . (23)
Proposition 3 indicates that, when the central bank insulates the nominal rate of in-
terest from seasonal fluctuations, changes in the interest rate may have complicated
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consequences for the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations. This point is illustrated
by the following example.
Example 1. Suppose that πewe/(1 − πe) > πowo/(1 − πo), πexew2e/(1 − πe)
< πoxow
2
o/(1 − πo), and xowo > xewe hold. Suppose further that
πe
1 − πe we −
πo
1 − πo wo <
πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo
(
xo
1 + n wo −
xe
1 + n we
)
is satisfied. Then, if the target value of I is set close to 1, ze < zo will hold.
Moreover, increases in I will increase ze/zo. Thus, over some range of target
values for the nominal rate of interest, higher settings of the target will reduce
the magnitude of the seasonal fluctuations in real balances. However, if I is set
sufficiently beyond this point, further increases in the nominal rate of interest will
continue to raise ze/zo, so that the magnitude of seasonal variation in real balances
will increase. In short, changes in monetary policy can easily have nonmonotonic
effects on the degree of seasonal variability.
Moreover, the effects of changes in the target nominal interest rate will affect
not only the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations in the level of real balances, but
also the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations in investment (storage). To see this,
note that, under a policy of maintaining a constant nominal rate of interest,
ke
ko
= 1 − γ (I, πe)
1 − γ (I, πo)
γ (I, πe)
γ (I, πo)
ze
zo
= 1 − πe
πe
πo
1 − πo
ze
zo
in a periodic equilibrium. Thus, anything that affects the degree of seasonal fluctu-
ations in real balances will also affect the degree of such fluctuations in investment.
Indeed, monetary policy changes must affect the degree of seasonality in invest-
ment because monetary policy works by injecting reserves into and withdrawing
reserves from the banking system. Changes in the target nominal rate of interest
modify the required seasonal pattern of reserve injections and withdrawals. As
a consequence, bank portfolios must be affected. This has implications for the
aggregate investment just noted.
4.3. Testable Predictions
We now briefly consider the extent to which our predictions about the conduct of
monetary policy and the size of the seasonals are reflected in the data. However, in
doing so, we are severely limited by the lack of comparable seasonally unadjusted
data series across countries.
As we have observed, our analysis predicts that, within any given monetary
regime, the setting of the appropriate target variable for monetary policy will affect
the magnitude of seasonal fluctuations in most endogenous variables. For example,
under a policy of maintaining a constant target rate of money creation, any increase
in the (geometric) average rate of inflation leads to an increase in the magnitude
of seasonal fluctuations in a periodic equilibrium. To find evidence related to this
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proposition, we employ cross-country data on seasonal fluctuations, compiled by
Beaulieu et al. (1992). Using their data set, the main empirical question we try to
answer is whether there is a positive relation across countries between the amount
of seasonal variation in macroeconomic variables and the average inflation rate.
As we have noted, if the degree of seasonal variation in real interest rates is
small,10 then an increase in the (geometric) average rate of inflation (the rate of
money growth), under a policy of preventing seasonality in the rate of base money
growth, will increase the seasonal standard deviation of the rate of inflation. In
a sample of 14 countries,11 the simple correlation between the average rate of
inflation and the seasonal standard deviation of inflation is 0.843. This correlation
is significant at the 10% level. Similarly, in a sample of 15 countries,12 the simple
correlation between the average rate of inflation and the seasonal standard deviation
of industrial production is 0.491. This correlation is significantly different from
zero at the 5% level.
On the basis of at least this casual evidence, we can conclude that there is some
support for the notion that higher rates of money creation (inflation) are associated
with a greater degree of seasonal variation in the data.
4.4. Nonperiodic Equilibria
We now briefly examine the scope for equilibria that are not purely periodic to
exist under different methods of conducting monetary policy. We begin with the
case of a constant rate of money growth.
4.4.1. Constant rate of money growth. When monetary policy is conducted by
holding the rate of money creation constant, equation (5) governs the evolution of
real balances. In Gomis-Poqueras and Smith (2002), we prove the following claim.
PROPOSITION 4. When there are nontrivial seasonal fluctuations, there is
a unique equilibrium in which money retains value asymptotically. This is the
periodic equilibrium derived above.
Thus, from a monetary policy perspective, the periodic equilibrium analyzed pre-
viously is the only interesting equilibrium.
4.4.2. Constant nominal rate of interest. When monetary policy maintains the
nominal rate of interest at a constant target value, equation (10) implies that, for t
even,
zt = πe1 − πe (I )
ρ−1
ρ we − πe1 − πe
πo
1 − πo
xo
(1 + n) (I )
ρ−2
ρ wo
+ πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo
xoxe
(1 + n)2 (I )
−2
ρ zt−2. (24)
Evidently, there is a unique periodic equilibrium, and this equilibrium is asymptot-
ically stable if (19) holds. Thus, in particular, when (19) holds, as we argue below is
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the empirically most plausible case, there is a continuum of nonstationary equilib-
ria, all of which converge to the periodic equilibrium. In short, a policy of insulating
the nominal rate of interest from seasonal fluctuations leads to an indeterminacy.
Moreover, all nonstationary equilibria will display seasonal fluctuations in real
balances exceeding those that would be observed in a purely periodic equilibrium.
Why does targeting the nominal rate of interest create so much scope for mul-
tiplicity of equilibria exhibiting endogenously generated volatility? The answer
is that, if agents demand high levels of real balances at t , the central bank, to
prevent the nominal interest rate from rising must inject reserves into the bank-
ing system. This reserve injection, in turn, increases the volume of deposits and,
consequently, the demand for reserves. As a result, actions that the central bank
take to hold the nominal rate of interest constant validate the endogenously high
level of demand for real balances at date t . Moreover, for this process not to be
destabilizing, the central bank must withdraw reserves at t + 1, implying a low
level of deposits and a low level of demand for real balances. Thus, any equilibria
where real balances deviate from their steady-state level must display oscillation.
Notice that a policy of nominal interest-rate targeting can, then, induce determin-
istic fluctuations. These resemble seasonals, except that these oscillations dampen
asymptotically. This observation suggests that a policy of nominal-interest-rate tar-
geting might lead to equilibria where seasonal variability is apparently amplified.
Such a conjecture is easily verified.
Finally, we observe that, along dynamical equilibrium paths where zt fluctuates,
economic volatility is not confined to fluctuations in real balances. The variability
of central bank reserve injections (lump-sum transfers) will also translate into
variability in investment activity (storage).
5. SEASONALITY, MONETARY POLICY, AND WELFARE
In this section, we confine our attention to periodic equilibria, and we ask whether
current Federal Reserve policy, which is to insulate nominal interest rates from
seasonal fluctuations, is or is not a “good policy.” In particular, we now allow the
central bank to target a (periodic) time path for the nominal rate of interest; that
is, we focus on policies where It = Ie(Io) for t even (odd).
We also assume that Ie Io = I 2 > 1, where I is the target value for the geometric
average for the nominal rate of interest. We take I as given, and, for a given value
of I , setting Ie = Io = I (preventing seasonal fluctuations from being manifested
in the nominal rate of interest) is a “good policy” if it maximizes “steady-state
welfare.” We now describe what we mean by the term steady-state welfare.
When banks choose their portfolios optimally, the expected utility of an agent
born at t is
(wt + τt )1−ρ
1 − ρ
(
πt
(
γ (It , πt )xt
πt It
)1−ρ
+ (1 − πt )
(
(1 − γ (It , πt ))xt
1 − πt
)1−ρ)
.
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To write this more compactly, we define the functions Vt for t even (odd) by
Vt (It ) = πρt
(
γ (It , πt )xt
It
)1−ρ
+ (1 − πt )ρ (xt (1 − γ (It , πt )))1−ρ.
Then, the expected utility of an agent born in an even period is [(we + τe)1−ρ/
(1 − ρ)] Ve(Ie), and the expected utility of an agent born in an odd period is
[(wo + τo)1−ρ/(1 − ρ)]Vo(Io). In general, different choices of Ie and Io satisfying
Ie Io = I 2 (with I given) will result in welfare gains for one group (e.g., those born
in even periods) at the expense of another group (e.g., those born in odd periods).
We therefore define steady-state welfare as follows:
W (Ie, Io) = 12
(we + τe)1−ρ
1 − ρ Ve(Ie) +
1
2
(wo + τo)1−ρ
1 − ρ Vo(Io). (25)
This welfare measure can be interpreted as the ex ante expected utility of an
arbitrary young agent who, prior to our knowing his date of birth, has an equal
probability of being born in an even or an odd period. We now examine how policy
choices affect this welfare measure.
To do so, it is necessary to determine the equilibrium values of the transfers τe
and τo. The government budget constraint implies that
τt = zt − zt−1 xt−11 + n
1
It−1
(26)
for all t . Using (26) in equation (5) then allows us to determine that
zt = γ (It , πt )1 − γ (It , πt )
(
wt − zt−1 xt−1
(1 + n)It−1
)
. (27)
Using the fact that γ (It , πt )/(1 − γ (It , πt )) = (πt/(1 − πt ))I (ρ−1)/ρt in (27), and
solving the resulting system of equations for ze and zo yields
ze =
πe
1 − πe I
ρ−1
ρ
e we − πe1 − πe
πo
1 − πo (I
2)
ρ−1
ρ
xowo
(1 + n)Io
1 − πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo I
−2
ρ
xoxe
(1 + n)2
≡ H(Ie, Io) (28)
and
zo =
πo
1 − πo I
ρ−1
ρ
o wo − πe1 − πe
πo
1 − πo (I
2)
ρ−1
ρ
xewe
(1 + n)Ie
1 − πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo I
−2
ρ
xoxe
(1 + n)2
≡ G(Ie, Io). (29)
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It then follows that
we + τe = we + H(Ie, Io) − xo1 + n
G(Ie, Io)
Io
=
(
1 + πe
1 − πe I
ρ−1
ρ
e
)(
we − πo1 − πo
xo
(1 + n) (Io)
−1/ρwo
)
1 − πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo I
−2
ρ
xoxe
(1 + n)2
≡ Q(Ie, Io)
(30)
and
wo + τo = w0 + G(Ie, Io) − xe1 + n
H(Ie, Io)
Ie
=
(
1 + πo
1 − πo I
ρ−1
ρ
o
)(
wo − πe1 − πe
xe
(1 + n) (Ie)
−1/ρwe
)
1 − πe
1 − πe
πo
1 − πo I
−2
ρ
xoxe
(1 + n)2
≡ R(Ie, Io).
(31)
Thus, steady-state welfare is given by the expression
W (Ie, Io) = 12
(Q(Ie, Io))1−ρ
1 − ρ Ve(Ie) +
1
2
(R(Ie, Io))1−ρ
1 − ρ Vo(Io). (32)
We now consider the problem of a government that chooses Ie and Io to maximize
W (Ie, Io) subject to the constraints that Ie Io = I 2 (with I 2 > 1 given), Ie ≥ 1, and
Io ≥ 1. This problem is sufficiently complicated that it is necessary to use numerical
methods to investigate the optimal choices of Ie and Io. To do so, we choose
parameter values that satisfy the following conditions. First, according to the 2000
edition of the Economic Report of the President, the average value of the ratio of
reserves-to-demand deposits over the 1990’s in the United States was 0.14. Second,
Rasche (1972) reports that the interest elasticity of excess reserves13 (with respect
to the nominal rate of interest on Treasury bills) is about −0.3. These figures
suggest that, in the absence of seasonal fluctuations, γ (I, π) = 0.14 and
Iγ1(I, π)
γ (I, π)
= − (1 − ρ)(1 − γ (I, π))
ρ
= −0.3
should hold.
For the gross (safe) real rate of return, in the absence of seasonality, we set
x = 1.04. This corresponds to Prescott’s (1986) calibrated value for a safe annual
real rate of return, in a steady state. In addition, according to the 2000 edition of
The Economic Report of the President, the average gross rate of inflation over the
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1990’s was 1.03. Thus, in a steady state (if there were no seasonal fluctuations), we
would like to set pt+1/pt = I/x = 1.03. Thus, I = 1.0712. We can then determine
that π ≈ 0.14, and ρ = 0.74. Finally, we set the rate of population growth to 1%
annually (n = 0.01), and—again absent seasonal variation—we set the endowment
w equal to per capita GDP. Thus, w = 27,924.
To introduce seasonal fluctuations, we proceed as follows. Since it is quite
possible that the nature of an optimal policy depends on the source of sea-
sonal variability—or on the relative importance of different sources of seasonal
variability—we examine different economies in which only one particular source
of seasonality is operative at any one time. Thus, if we = wo, for example, we set
xe = xo and πe = πo. Of course, ultimately, we examine all three possible sources
of seasonal impulses.
For whichever exogenous variable does vary seasonally, we assume that its
geometric average is equal to the steady-state value given previously. Thus, if
we = wo, we impose that √wewo = w = 27, 924. Similarly, if xe = xo(πe = πo),
we require that √xexo = x = 1.04 (√πeπo = π = 0.14).
It remains to describe the magnitude of the exogenous seasonal impulse. To do
so, if we = wo, we let we = wo. Similarly, if xe = xo (πe = πo), we set xe = xo
(πe = πo). With this parameterization, if σw is the standard deviation of the loga-
rithm of w (and, similarly, σx and σπ are the standard deviations of the logarithms
of x and π ), we have σw = ln
√
. To fix ideas, we will always let  > 1 hold.
Barsky and Miron (1989) find that the percentage standard deviation in per-
capita income, due to seasonal fluctuations, is 2.51%. This observation, along with
the calculations above, suggests that a reasonable value for  (at least with respect
to seasonal income) is 1.051. Thus, we set  = 1.05. However, we experimented
with other values for ( = 1.01 and  = 1.1) with no qualitative difference in
results.
Example 2. Suppose we substitute Io = I 2/Ie into the government’s objective
function. Figure 3 plots the function ¯W (Ie) = W (Ie, I 2/Ie) if xe = xo (implying
we = wo and πe = πo), when I = 1.0712. Clearly, the function ¯W (Ie) is concave,
and it attains a maximum at Ie = 1.086 (implying Io = 1.056). Note that the implied
magnitude of seasonal fluctuation in the nominal rate of interest is Ie/Io = 1.028,
so that an optimal policy involves the nominal rate of interest exhibiting smaller
seasonal variation than the real rate of interest. Here, “peak-to-trough” seasonal
movements in the rate of inflation are given by the ratio (Ie/Io)(xe/xo). It follows
that the rate of inflation exhibits even smaller seasonal variability than the nominal
rate of interest. In addition, the rate of inflation will be lowest in seasons when the
real rate of interest is highest.
To summarize, the optimal policy smooths the seasonality in nominal interest
rates (relative to the magnitude of the underlying seasonal impulse). However, it
also smoothes the seasonality in inflation (relative to the magnitude of the same
underlying seasonal impulse). For this reason, it is not optimal to completely
insulate the nominal rate of interest from seasonal factors.
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FIGURE 3. The function ¯W (Ie) = W (Ie, I 2/Ie), seasonality in real interest rates.
TABLE 1. Seasonality in real returns: Optimal nominal rates of interest seasonally
for alternative “average” nominal rates of interest
I I ∗e I ∗e /I ∗o Ie Transfer Transfer F.R.
1.05 1.07 1.035 1.08 0.001 −1.5
1.07 1.09 1.029 1.10 0.9 0.2
1.09 1.11 1.025 1.12 0.9 3.86
1.11 1.14 1.054 1.15 1.2 10.2
1.13 1.15 1.031 1.16 0.95 15.7
1.15 1.17 1.03 1.18 1.28 23.1
1.17 1.19 1.028 1.2 1.0 32.0
Table 1 reports the optimal value of Ie, and the optimal ratio Ie/Io, for the
same economy but for different average values of the nominal rate of interest (I ).
Evidently, as the average value of the nominal rate of interest increases, optimal
monetary policy initially involves a reduction in the magnitude of seasonal vari-
ability in nominal rates. However, this is not true globally: Once I is sufficiently
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large, further increases in it render it optimal to allow the magnitude of seasonal
fluctuations in the nominal rate of interest to increase.
To describe the magnitude of welfare losses from suboptimal settings of policy,
Table 1 also reports the compensation (additional, seasonally independent transfer)
that each young agent would have to receive to make them indifferent between
the optimal policy and a policy that sets Ie one percentage point higher than its
optimal level (with Ie Io = I 2 continuing to hold). The necessary transfer is tiny—
about 3/10,000th of 1% of per-capita income. This finding suggests the relative
unimportance—from a welfare perspective—of smoothing or not smoothing the
nominal rate of interest seasonally. However, two caveats to this remark should
be offered. First, the method by which money is injected into the economy works
to minimize welfare losses from suboptimal policy settings. In particular, young
agents get high transfers when the nominal interest rate is high, in effect “insuring”
agents against being born in unfortunate seasons. Thus, if money were injected
into the economy by different means, the welfare losses from suboptimal policy
choices would tend to be higher.
Second, the fact that deviations from the optimal setting of policy do not have
large welfare effects does not imply that monetary policy choices necessarily have
small effects on equilibrium quantities. For instance, it is widely thought that the
welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations are small [Lucas (1987)], and yet, this
does not lead anyone to argue that how monetary policy affects business-cycle
fluctuations is an unimportant issue.
Finally, Table 1 also reports the welfare “loss” associated with deviations from
the Friedman rule (maintenance of a zero nominal rate of interest). Note that, for
I = 1.05, this loss is negative—that is, the Friedman rule is not optimal here. It
allows insufficient (specifically, no) seasonal variation in nominal rates of interest.
However, the welfare loss from following the Friedman rule is also not large.
Example 3 (we = wo). Again, the function ¯W (Ie) is concave, and it attains a
maximum at Ie = 1.112 (implying Io = 1.0313). At an optimum, Ie/Io = 1.078
holds. Thus, when seasonal impulses derive from endowments (income), the nom-
inal interest rate should vary more, seasonally, than the exogenous driving variable.
Moreover, with real returns constant, the same will be true for the rate of inflation.
Intuitively, the monetary authority can transfer utility from agents born in even
periods (those with high endowments) to agents born in odd periods by making
the nominal rate of interest relatively high (low) in even (odd) periods. In this case,
optimal transfers involve relatively large seasonal variation in the nominal rate of
interest. In other words, when the source of seasonality derives from exogenous
income movements, it is completely inappropriate to engage in smoothing either
nominal interest rates or the rate of inflation seasonally.
Table 2 reports the optimal values of Ie, and Ie/Io, for alternative “average”
values of the nominal rate of interest. Clearly, Ie/Io does not vary monotonically
with I . The table also reports the compensation (transfer) necessary to compensate
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TABLE 2. Seasonality in endowments: Optimal nominal rates of interest seasonally
for alternative “average” nominal rates of interest
I I ∗e I ∗e /I ∗o Ie Transfer Transfer F.R.
1.05 1.09 1.073 1.10 0.2 −7.2
1.07 1.11 1.078 1.12 0.9 −4.74
1.09 1.13 1.072 1.14 0.1 −0.845
1.11 1.16 1.09 1.16 1.3 4.5
1.13 1.17 1.076 1.19 0.49 11.53
1.15 1.20 1.083 1.22 1.5 18.0
1.17 1.22 1.08 1.24 1.65 27.6
TABLE 3. Seasonality in liquidity demand: Optimal nominal rates of interest
seasonally for alternative “average” nominal rates of interest
I I ∗e I ∗e /I ∗o Ie Transfer Transfer F.R.
1.05 1.07 1.038 1.08 1.6 −1.78
1.07 1.08 1.019 1.09 0.4 0.7
1.09 1.10 1.018 1.11 0.8 4.5
1.11 1.12 1.018 1.14 0.9 10.22
1.13 1.14 1.013 1.16 1.35 16.7
1.15 1.17 1.012 1.19 1.99 24.9
1.17 1.18 1.010 1.2 0.4 33.4
agents if Ie is set one percentage point higher than its optimal level. Again, the
implied welfare loss is quite small relative to per-capita income. However, the
previous caveats still apply. Finally, note once again that the Friedman rule is not
optimal.
Example 4 (πe = πo). As before, the function ¯W (Ie) is concave, and it at-
tains a maximum at Ie = 1.081 (implying Io = 1.0609). Here, an optimum has
Ie/Io = 1.019. Thus, the optimal policy in the presence of seasonal variation in
liquidity demand does closely approximate eliminating seasonality from nominal
interest rates.
Table 3 shows how the optimal seasonal pattern of nominal interest rates varies
with the “average” nominal rate of interest. As is clear from the table, this pattern
is essentially independent of the average of the nominal rate of interest. Also, as
before, the welfare losses associated with minor deviations from the optimal policy
are quite small. Finally, once again, a pursuit of the Friedman rule is suboptimal
in this example.
To summarize, eliminating seasonality in the nominal rate of interest is close
to an optimal policy when the source of seasonality is driven by the demand for
liquidity needs. When seasonality derives from exogenous fluctuations in income,
smoothing nominal rates of interest or inflation seasonally is a relatively “bad”
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policy. In fact, nominal interest rates should display seasonal fluctuations that
are large relative to seasonal fluctuations in income. Finally, seasonality driven
by exogenous technological fluctuations that affect real rates of return should
be met by allowing the nominal rate of interest to vary seasonally. However,
seasonal movements in the nominal rate of interest should be small relative to
exogenous seasonal impulses. Interestingly, these results on the optimal sea-
sonal time path for the nominal rates of interest are nearly seasonal analogs of
Poole’s (1970) results on the optimal choice of interest rate versus money supply
rules.
6. CONCLUSIONS
From a practical perspective, seasonal fluctuations are quite important. They equal
or exceed cyclical fluctuations in magnitude. In addition, from the perspective of
monetary policy, the presence of seasonality poses an important question. How
should seasonal fluctuations be dealt with, from a policy perspective? Moreover,
should monetary policy seek to insulate nominal rates of interest, the rate of infla-
tion, or the rate of money growth from seasonal influences?
Historically, at least in the United States, seasonal fluctuations had their most
dramatic manifestation in the form of recurring strains on the financial system.
Therefore, we considered these issues in a framework that places the banking
system in the forefront. In this context, we have demonstrated that policies in-
tended to insulate nominal rates of interest, or the rate of inflation, from seasonal
fluctuation are formulas for generating an indeterminacy of equilibrium. They thus
fail Friedman’s test that desirable policies should not inject additional sources of
economic noise. In contrast, the policy of maintaining a constant rate of monetary
growth does not suffer from this problem.
We have also shown that, within any particular monetary policy regime, settings
of the monetary policy target in question will generally affect the magnitude of
seasonal fluctuations in all endogenous variables (other than the one targeted). This
is an important result because it suggests the existence of a previously unexplored
channel by which monetary policy might have real effects.
Finally, we have shown that the case for smoothing nominal rates of inter-
est depends on the source of seasonal impulses. If seasonality derives largely
from shifts in the demand schedule for money, insulating nominal interest rates
from seasonal fluctuations is not far from an optimal policy. However, if sea-
sonal fluctuations are driven by real factors, such as changes in technology or
endowments, the case for eliminating seasonals in nominal rates of interest is
much weaker. This suggests that the current Federal Reserve policy, which does
eliminate seasonality in nominal rates of interest, can only be justified if sea-
sonal fluctuations derive largely from shifts in the demand for money. It would
be interesting to see the case articulated that this is, in fact, the situation we
confront.
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NOTES
1. In other words, the currency deposit ratio was high when crops were being sent to market.
2. Important exceptions to this statement include Sargent and Wallace (1982), Mankiw and Miron
(1991), Chatterjee (1997), Braun and Evans (1998), and Liu (2000).
3. This assumption is relatively innocuous. The consequences of relaxing this assumption are
described by Gomis-Poqueras and Smith (2002).
4. The assumption that ρ < 1 will imply that banks’ demands for reserves are a decreasing function
of the nominal rate of interest.
5. As noted previously, our derivations are predicated on currency being dominated in the rate of
return, so that It > 1 holds for all t . Environments similar to ours, where the Friedman rule (It ≡ 1) is
shown to be suboptimal, are described by Paal and Smith (2000) and Smith (2002). In addition, as we
show, the Friedman rule may be suboptimal in this environment as well.
6. Seasonality that affects real rates of return is very similar to that considered by Sargent and
Wallace (1982) and Champ et al. (1996).
7. It continues to be the case, under this policy, that M0 is given as an initial condition.
8. The policy of maintaining a constant rate of inflation would work in a similar fashion—and,
in fact, in an identical fashion—if xe = xo. Hence, we do not explicitly consider that policy here.
9. As we demonstrate later, this condition will be satisfied for empirically plausible parameter
values.
10. Small seasonal variation in real interest rates is the empirically plausible case since, as observed
in the Introduction, a policy of eliminating seasonals in the nominal rate of interest also seems to virtually
eliminate seasonality in the rate of inflation.
11. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan,
Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United States from 1961 to 1987.
12. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States from 1961 to
1987.
13. See Schreft and Smith (2001) for a justification of this elasticity in a more modern context.
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